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AFIT/GEM/ENV/09-M15 
Abstract 
 
 
Suspicion has not been studied in great depth; however, a conceptual understanding 
of suspicion is no less important than many of the other highly studied constructs related to 
healthy working relationships.  Information technology (IT) is one area where suspicion 
study is lacking, and this research effort was a study into the specific domain of IT suspicion. 
 An extensive study of the suspicion literature and the suspicion nomological net as 
well as informal surveys of the general populous and subject matter experts were used to 
create an IT suspicion conceptual definition and measure. In order to test IT suspicion’s 
relationships with other more established constructs a survey was created.  The final pilot 
study consisted of two measures from suspicions nomological net, locus of control and 
disposition to trust, a trait IT suspicion measure, a manipulation exercise on a laptop 
computer intended to induce suspicion, and finally a state suspicion measure. 
 Analysis indicated IT suspicion is a multi-dimensional construct, with independent 
state and trait properties.  It also has separate dimensions within the state and trait 
components.  Comparisons between the components of the IT suspicion construct and related 
measures indicated a negative correlation between state suspicion and locus of control. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF IT SUSPICION AS A CONSTRUCT AND SUBSEQUENT 
MEASURE 
I.   Introduction 
 
The idea of suspicion is one that is common in everyday conversation.  Most 
people intuitively have a conceptualization of suspicion in their minds, but would have a 
hard time expressing it in terms of a definable construct that can be studied.  Similarly, 
suspicion is a concept that is often loosely identified or undefined by researchers because, 
as is often the case, they assume the reader knows the definition of the construct under 
investigation.   In most cases, suspicion is tangentially mentioned in an attempt to 
describe the real target of the research.  Such literature is full of nebulous or assumed 
definitions for suspicion, not conceptualizing it in a way that makes it truly valuable to 
research on its own.  This effort attempts to fill the void by creating conceptual definition 
and measure for a domain of suspicion. 
While suspicion is briefly mentioned in many organizational behavior studies, 
there are few examples of research focused specifically on the different domains of 
suspicion.  Most that do exist center on generic communication-related suspicion.  
Another (Levine and McCornack, 1991) focused on suspicion in criminology and prisons 
rather than suspicion in productive working relationships.  Based on this, there appears to 
be some conceptualizations for suspicion that would inform the domain, if researched.   
 In addition to minimal domain-specific suspicion research, an even smaller 
number of validated measures for suspicion exist.  When some forms of suspicion are 
defined and researched, manipulation checks (Caso et al., 2006) and validation are often 
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incomplete.  A lack of proper validation makes a small list of domain-specific suspicion 
research even smaller.  Few suspicion studies combined with inconsistent validation 
creates a deficiency in the suspicion literature. 
Taking a high-level view of suspicion and creating a research topic out of it 
requires focusing suspicion within an overarching context, such as a jury’s suspicion of 
guilt or innocence of a criminal on trial.  Once a context has been determined, thorough 
research of the context can be accomplished and a focused definition of suspicion within 
that context can be created.  Framing suspicion in such a way is necessary to make it 
testable. 
One viable context for researching suspicion is the area of information technology 
(IT).   The information systems and computer technology that make up IT are important 
to nearly every individual in the modern world, and this is a fertile area, full of weakly 
defined concepts (Barki, 2008) that could be developed into constructs.  Research into 
cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral constructs set within a reference of IT will provide 
valuable results; therefore IT is the context of this suspicion research. 
IT is a primary tool used to perform work, communicate, and store information by 
nearly every company today.  For the purposes of this research, information technology 
will be defined as the computer systems, software, and networks used for the processing, 
distribution and storage of data.  Computer hardware and software and the global 
communication network have become the backbone for obtaining, processing, storing, 
and interpreting data and information for the execution of daily operations in nearly every 
organization. 
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 The practical importance of suspicion in terms of IT is easy to visualize.  Security, 
validity, and authenticity are always of primary concern when dealing with important and 
sensitive information, and requirements for protecting and disseminating this type of 
information abound in today’s organizations.  For obvious reasons, security of IT systems 
is crucial.  The information and IT infrastructure must be protected to ensure smooth 
organizational operations.  The perceived validity of any information delivered using IT 
is also important, and it would seem natural that questioning the validity of IT delivered 
information could have a negative impact on organizational activities.  Uncertainty of 
information authenticity (who it came from) could also lead to hesitation and work 
failure.  This uncertainty can arise from not trusting the human source of the information 
in the IT system or not trusting the computer-mediated communication infrastructure that 
replaces face-to-face communication.  This concept should be measured in some manner, 
and a construct of IT suspicion seems to be a natural way of doing that. This leads to the 
problem statement of this research. 
What is Information Technology suspicion and how can it be measured? 
 
Research Objectives 
 The objectives of this research effort are to (1) define a construct for IT suspicion, 
(2) create a subjective measure for this construct, (3) acquire a mobile lab for 
administering the construct measure and for future research, and (4) execute a pilot study 
of the measure to guide future research. 
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Methodology 
The first step in creating and measuring a construct is the theoretical activity of 
generating a conceptual definition.  A conceptual definition of the IT suspicion construct 
cannot be created without a review of the existing suspicion related research.  The 
existing literatures must be used to clearly define the concept of IT suspicion and identify 
dimensions for the construct.  Once complete, the nomological network of IT suspicion 
can then be explored, examining convergent and discriminate validity (Judge et al., 2003) 
of the new IT suspicion construct.  The sum of these activities is a validated theoretical 
IT suspicion construct. 
 Once an IT construct has been created, the empirical activity of producing a 
corresponding subjective measure is required for data gathering and future hypothesis 
testing.  Multiple items are generated using information gathered from measures of 
existing related constructs and subject matter expert input.  Items are then validated and 
analyzed using appropriate statistical methods. 
 In order to administer the suspicion measure and collect data, a mobile test lab 
was procured.  Computers with a manipulation exercise were used to induce suspicion in 
the test subjects.  The equipment will also be used as a platform allowing for further 
research in the area of IT suspicion, including further sampling and revised measures 
incorporating team activities. 
 The final step in this research was administering a pilot study of the IT suspicion 
measure.  Results were analyzed to further validate measure items and outline areas of 
possible future research. 
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Implications 
Measuring IT suspicion is a very important concept as it relates to both industry 
and the DoD.  When dealing with IT, there is a delicate balance between system security 
and availability.  The greater the level of security required, the greater the tendency to 
reduce ease of use (Pipkin, 2000).  This carries over well into the concept of IT suspicion.  
Ensuring critical military data and information is maintained in a way that ensures 
authentication, integrity, and confidentially is important, but it must not be so buried in 
security procedures as to make it unavailable to all allied combatants who need it.  IT 
suspicion mirrors security’s relationship to capability, too little or too much can lead to 
disaster. 
The absence of IT suspicion can be disastrous for corporate or national security.  
The United States has many enemies home and abroad, and these enemies are constantly 
attempting to probe, hack, and disrupt the IT systems and infrastructure of the United 
States government or major corporations.  One hacker group alone, Javaphile, has 
launched over 200 attacks on the US government and other NATO allies (Henderson, 
2007).  An employee ignoring the possibility of these attacks leaves the United States far 
more vulnerable.  Ignoring the possibility of attack through lack of suspicion can lead to 
theft or destruction of classified information or trade secrets, denial of production or 
critical war fighting services, and loss or intercept of sensitive organizational 
communication. 
A second, less obvious reason to characterize the level of IT suspicion is that too 
much suspicion can have a negative impact on productivity. Every day more and more 
communications and collaboration are electronic instead of face to face, so it is crucial 
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that IT systems in different organizations communicate securely and effectively.  High 
levels of suspicion can negatively impact communication and productivity in an inter- or 
intra-organizational context. 
High levels of suspicion lead to guarded, competitive behavior which has a 
negative impact on common goal seeking, positive compromise, and collaboration 
(Heretick, 1984).  In a DoD environment driven by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the 
Global War on Terror to a more joint arena, overly suspicious attitudes can create tension 
and conflict between the armed services and their organizations, negatively impacting 
mission accomplishment.  The commercial sector can also be damaged by suspicion 
levels that are too high.  Business strategies now include more collaborations than ever 
with increased outsourcing and business partnerships (Pipkin, 2000).  Suspicion above a 
healthy level could affect the taking of action and the bottom line. 
In addition to damaging inter-organizational relationships, high suspicion levels 
also negatively impact intra-organizational activities within the Air Force.  The exact 
relationship between trust and suspicion depends upon how each is defined, but Hoffman 
states that suspicion negatively affects a trusting relationship (Hoffman, 2007).  This 
means high suspicion leads to a relationship lacking trust, creating a chain of command 
that lacks trust in superiors and subordinates.  In such an organization, poor trust would 
lead to poor delegation and communication.  In addition, suspicion makes individuals less 
likely to conform to procedures (Stricker et al., 1967) that are healthy and required for 
organizational success.  Poor delegation and communication lead to inefficient use of 
resources.  Poor communication also leads to lower productivity through incorrect 
explanation of expectations, poor feedback, and numerous other problems.  The negative 
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impact of lack of trust and high suspicion in a work environment is summed up best by 
Hoffman when he said trusting takes less effort (Hoffman, 2007). 
With all the implications of too much or too little IT suspicion, it is apparent that 
knowledge about what causes it to increase and decrease is important.  Creating and 
testing a measure for IT suspicion is the first steps in a stream of study that will allow the 
researchers to characterize these antecedents and what scenarios and technologies create 
healthy and unhealthy levels of suspicion. 
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II.  Literature Review 
IT Suspicion Definition Methodology 
Research into the area of IT suspicion cannot proceed without formally defining 
IT suspicion.  If there is indeed an abundance of opportunities to develop validated IT 
constructs in order to provide a better understanding of IT relationships (Barki, 2008), it 
starts with a clearly defined concept of IT suspicion since “a valid definition for a 
concept is a prerequisite to a valid measurement” (Locke, 2003, p. 417).  Choosing 
techniques for creating, testing, and refining a construct that promote thoroughness and 
validity are the most important steps in this research effort.  Numerous methodologies 
exist to produce a well-bounded and sound definition for IT suspicion.  Several 
approaches are outlined in Barki (2008) and a few of those seem particularly relevant and 
are used in this research. 
Intuitively, defining a construct would appear to be as simple as looking it up in a 
dictionary.  However, constructs are abstract (Bacharach, 1989), and such simple one 
dimension conclusions do not provide the required level of rigor necessary to adequately 
conceptualize such an abstraction.  As previously stated, suspicion is a concept 
mentioned sometimes in the literature but with few conceptual definitions offered, and 
none that relate to IT.  Consequently, a testable definition of IT suspicion simply does not 
exist. 
Generating a proper conceptualization of IT suspicion is the first step in defining 
this construct.  Exploring how the construct of IT suspicion applies in different contexts 
and expanding the conceptualization of the construct (Barki, 2008) are important steps.  
Barki (2008) discusses many approaches in terms of determining new, useful constructs, 
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but it should follow that these methods would also be useful in defining a specific 
construct under a larger reference umbrella, like IT suspicion under suspicion.  
Examining IT suspicion in different contexts and trying to relate it to an expanded or 
altered conceptualization of another suspicion-like construct helped to narrow down the 
definition and determine which existing construct items may be useful.  When generating 
a conceptual definition of a construct, using other established constructs that are related 
to the construct being studied can also be useful (Bacharach, 1989).  Other validated 
constructs such as domains of trust are critical to this research effort. 
A literature review and completion of the steps listed above provide a list of 
constructs related to IT suspicion.  These constructs make up the nomological network 
for IT suspicion (Judge et al., 2003) and prove useful in validation and the creation of the 
IT suspicion measure.  The method used to generate IT suspicion measure items from the 
nomological network defined in this literature review are discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
IT Suspicion Defined 
 As discussed above, the creation of an IT suspicion construct requires the 
examination of suspicion constructs in other literatures as well as constructs related to 
suspicion.  Existing suspicion definitions vary in scope, as do their respective constructs, 
when constructs have been created.  The biggest difference in existing suspicion research 
is the relationship suspicion is examined under, in other words, who is suspicious of 
what.  In addition, some researchers characterize suspicion from a state perspective, only 
analyzing a current situation.  In contrast, others view suspicion from a trait perspective, 
requiring the long-term observation to determine tendencies.  Even the quantification of 
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suspicion varies, with some researchers viewing suspicion as a dichotomy, while others 
quantify suspicion using a continuous scale.   
The existing literature was searched by using the Social Sciences Citation Index 
of the ISI Web of Knowledge online academic database.  The key word “suspicion” 
yielded an initial set of results containing articles on suspicion and suspicion related 
constructs.  A review of those articles was used to generate a preliminary nomological net 
for suspicion including trust and locus of control.  The literature review was completed 
by searching under the key words “trust” and “locus of control”, as well as by using 
references from articles from all three searches.  This yielded a collection of works that 
conceptually define suspicion and its nomological net, characterize the relationships 
between the concepts in that net, and provide constructs and items to measure these 
concepts. 
 Suspicion was the primary focus of the literature review.  Heretick researched 
suspicion and trust as it relates to gender differences.  In her research she conceptually 
defined suspicion as “expectancies that another is self-motivated” (Heretick, 1984, p. 29) 
and a construct called trust-suspicion (T-S) as “expectancies that others are generally 
motivated to be supportive and beneficial toward others” (Heretick, 1984, p. 28).  While 
her conceptual definition of suspicion does not address the temporal specifics of the 
sender/receiver relationship, the T-S conceptual definition does through the phrase 
“generally motivated”, implying an enduring relationship and a trait construct.  In 
addition, in her conceptual suspicion definition, Heretick did not address whether self-
motivation leads to a positive or negative outcome.  Self-motivation by the sending party 
could still lead to positive results for the receiving party. 
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 Fein (1996) also examined suspicion in a purely conceptual manner, specifically 
as it relates to personal motives.  He defined suspicion as “a dynamic state in which the 
individual actively entertains multiple, plausibly rival hypotheses about the motives or 
genuineness of a person's behavior” (Fein, 1996, p. 1165).  His definition differs from 
Heretick’s in that it defined suspicion as a state instead of trait characteristic, but he also 
maintained an outcome-neutral stance about the sender’s potential self-motivation.   
 Both Heretick and Fein appeared to consider the receiver’s perception of the 
motivation of the sender’s behavior in their conceptual definitions of suspicion.  
Motivation can be defined as “a set of energetic forces that originate both within as well 
as beyond an individual’s being, to initiate work-related behavior and to determine its 
form, direction, intensity, and duration” (Pinder, 1998).   When relating this definition to 
motivation of IT in an IT suspicion conceptual definition, the form of the behavior could 
be considered IT.  Intensity and duration could also be considered the amount of effect 
and temporal length of the behavior that would arouse suspicion of IT.  For direction, we 
can examine Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, White, and Rockwell. 
 Burgoon et al. examine suspicion in terms of Interpersonal Deception Theory, 
researching behaviors of two individuals when deception was implanted into their 
communication.  In their research, suspicion was defined as “a receiver variable that 
refers to doubt about another’s truthfulness or honesty” (Burgoon et al., 1996, p. 243), 
and the research subject was simply asked to rate their suspicion on a continuous scale.  
Like Fein, this is another example of a state suspicion concept of a dyadic relationship.  
Where it differs from the previous two examples is that it is not outcome neutral.  “Doubt 
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about another’s truthfulness or honesty” definitely carries a negative connotation with it.  
Therefore, the direction of the outcome is negative. 
 Levine and McCornack researched the relationship between trust, suspicion, and 
lie bias, or the “bias toward decoding all incoming messages as deceptive” (Levine and 
McCornack, 1991, p. 328).  In their research, they define generalized communication 
suspicion (GCS) as a “predisposition toward believing that the messages produced by 
others are deceptive” and stated that it is a “relatively consistent and enduring tendency” 
(Levine and McCornack, 1991, p. 328).  Their GCS construct measured suspicion as a 
trait characteristic on a continuous scale.  Like Burgoon et al., Levine and McCornack 
viewed the potential outcome direction as negative, only more directly by stating the 
“messages produced by others are deceptive”.  Of note, at the time of their research, 
Levine and McCornack stated no attempt had been made to develop distinctions between 
different types of suspicion and no prior attempt had been made to create an instrument 
for measuring GCS (Levine and McCornack, 1991). 
In addition to defining GCS, Levine and McCornack also defined a concept called 
general state suspicion as “the situation-specific belief that the messages of a particular 
person may be deceptive.  As such, state suspicion can be aroused by a particular event or 
cue within a context” (Levine and McCornack, 1991, p. 329).  Previous examples also 
demonstrated that suspicion can be a state or trait concept.  It follows that if a general 
trait suspicion can determined and a stimulus applied, a state suspicion of that particular 
stimulus could be determined. 
 One final consideration in developing an IT suspicion construct is to ensure 
survey questions address suspicion related to IT, not toward the method of data gathering.  
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In their research into suspicion of deception, Stricker, Messick, and Jackson (1967) used 
different open-ended questionnaires for suspicion of the purpose of the research and 
suspicion in the method of the research.  Results showed differences between suspicion 
of method and suspicion of the purpose of their research, showing the importance of 
being specific in IT suspicion survey questions.  A subject may not be suspicious of IT at 
all, but suspicion of the purpose of the research, which can distort results if surveys are 
not written and administered properly. 
As the previously listed suspicion definitions show, suspicion is commonly 
defined in terms of the individual who is suspicious (the receiver) and the individual who 
generates the suspicion (the sender).  A unique problem encountered in defining IT 
suspicion is the sender isn’t an individual at all; the sender is the information technology 
used to pass various services and forms of information to receiver.  IT does not have 
hidden emotional motives as a driver of performance and actions.  Actions are driven by 
design, inputs, physics, and logic.  Some inputs, however, do come from other 
individuals, and real people do design, build, and maintain IT systems.  Truthfulness and 
deception from other definitions of suspicion associated with people become accurateness 
and corruption of data.  Individual motives aren’t doubted; IT system designs and policies 
are doubted.  So from this, the following motivational and perceived outcome based 
definition for IT suspicion emerges:   
User perceptions that the direction, duration, and intensity of an IT systems behavior will 
negatively impact their task. 
Combining this definition with the definition of IT given in Chapter 1, evidence 
does exist for the possibility of multiple suspicion dimensions, even within the different 
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contexts of state and trait suspicion.  IT can be sub-categorized into the general physical 
hardware and software that make up a system and the electrons, or data, which are passed 
around and stored within the system.  Items in the subsequent chapter should be written 
for general system suspicion as well as suspicion of the data contained within. 
 
Correlated and Related Constructs 
Trust and suspicion intuitively seem to have a strong relationship, so exploring 
that relationship helped build an IT suspicion construct.  While it can be argued trust and 
suspicion are related, Levine and McCornack give two strong arguments why suspicion 
and interpersonal trust are not opposites.  First, lack of trust is questioning whether a 
person will do the right thing while suspicion is questioning if they will do the wrong 
thing.  Second, trust involves belief in a positive outcome while suspicion involves 
uncertainty about the possibility of a negative outcome (Levine and McCornack, 1991).  
Lack of trust doesn’t mean a bad outcome and lack of suspicion doesn’t mean a good 
outcome.  There is, however, a high, negative correlation between the two (Levine & 
McCornack, 1991) which proves useful in construct assembly and validation.  However, 
since suspicion and trust aren’t opposites, the trust constructs must be reviewed very 
carefully before considering how, or if, components of the trust construct should be 
integrated into the IT suspicion construct. 
 There are many definitions of trust in existing literature.  One study defined trust 
as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, 1998, p. 395).  
Another stated “At its core, trust refers to an actor's perception that it may safely delegate 
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control over its interests to others (that is, potential trustees) under certain circumstances.  
This perception is rooted in the belief that potential trustees will protect the interests 
placed in their care even if some of their own interests suffer.”  (Hoffman, 2007, p. 288).  
Still another defined a concept called interpersonal trust as “an expectancy held by an 
individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal, or written statement of another 
individual or group can be relied upon.”  (Rotter, 1967, p. 664).  One thing to be aware of 
when comparing trust to suspicion is to ensure that the intent is properly translated from 
one to the other.  As stated previously, all variables associated with a lack of trust are not 
necessarily caused by the thought of possible deception.  It can be caused by a perceived 
lack of capability of the trustee.  The trustor may not be suspicious of the trustee’s intent, 
but they may not be confident in the trustee’s ability to complete a task. 
Another article defined trust “in terms of confident positive expectations 
regarding another’s conduct, and distrust in terms of confident negative expectations 
regarding another’s conduct” (Lewicki et al., 1998, p. 439).  This definition of trust and 
distrust provides an avenue for examining the relationship between trust and suspicion.  
The authors’ definition of distrust is very similar to the above conceptual definition of 
suspicion.  They go on to say that “low distrust is not the same as high trust” (Lewicki et 
al., 1998, p. 444) and give examples where low trust and low distrust or high trust and 
high distrust can exist.  This further validates that trust and suspicion are not the same 
dimension simply reversed.  Instead, they are related constructs. 
According to Li, Hess, and Valacich, trust has five bases that make up a general 
trust formation.  The five are personality base, cognitive base, calculative base, 
institutional base, and knowledge base (Li et al., 2008).  Personality equates to a tendency 
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or trait, similar to the trait characteristic of GCS.  Cognitive and knowledge bases are 
related to second and first-hand experience with the trustee.  The calculative base 
assumes a trustee will act in their own best interest, so a trustor will logically trust a 
trustee if it is no benefit to the trustee to deceive the trustor.  A situation where there is of 
no benefit to the trustee to deceive the trustor can potentially create a scenario of lack 
trust but no suspicion.  A trustor will not believe in hidden motives by the trustee, so no 
suspicion, but the trustor may not trust the institution base.  An example of this may be an 
individual has no need to be suspicious of malicious intent or hidden motives of a news 
website on the internet but the individual has no reason to trust the validity of the content.  
This is another instance that demonstrates that trust and suspicion are not exact opposites. 
Trust and suspicion are, however, very similar.  Since trust is a far more 
researched construct than suspicion, this makes trust a very useful tool in creating a 
suspicion construct and in validating it.  Care must still be taken to ensure a trust item 
used in a suspicion construct isn’t one of the examples of lack of trust not equaling 
suspicion. 
While IT trust and suspicion are not prevalent topics in existing research, trust 
related to e-commerce is well researched.  For example, McKnight et al. (2002) defined 
the relationship between the disposition to trust, perception of the internet environment, 
and trusting beliefs as it relates to influencing trust intentions and trust actions.  The 
simple model illustrated in Figure 1 helps explain how trust and a particular environment 
shape an individual’s attitudes about a specific information technology.  Disposition to 
trust is a representation of trait trust and trusting beliefs and intentions are similar to a 
state trust or trust of a specific thing or person at a specific time.  Both must be measured 
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to obtain a complete picture of a specific domain of trust.  It follows that it would be the 
same for suspicion; measurements of trait suspicion and state suspicion are necessary to 
obtain a complete understanding of IT suspicion.  Validated trust measures can also be 
used in determining convergent validity. 
 
Figure 1.  Trust Model Based on McKnight et al., 2002 
 
Locus of control is defined as the degree to which individuals believe they 
control their own fate (Robbins and Judge, 2008).  Individuals who have a high locus of 
control tend to be less suspicious while people who don’t believe they control their lives 
are more suspicious because they believe they have no power to change their 
environment (Robbins and Judge, 2008).  Locus of control is a trait attitudinal 
characteristic which cannot be directly used to generate any type of suspicion construct or 
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measure items because it is a completely different dimension.  However, since the two 
are related, a locus of control measure can be used to determine convergent validity of a 
suspicion measure.  
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III.  Methods 
 
Measure Generation 
Given the presented definition of IT suspicion, a measure for it can now be 
created.  The measure consists of three parts, the trait measures from suspicion’s 
nomological net, the trait suspicion measure for establishing the baseline, and the state 
suspicion measure.  The trait measures from the suspicion nomological net, trust and 
locus of control, were added to for validity testing in the analysis. 
For this research, three areas were mined for input for the measure items.  They 
are the literature, subject matter experts, and the general population.  These resources 
were utilized in two deductive and one inductive approach to determine items for an IT 
suspicion measure. 
Hinkin (1995) outlined two different deductive approaches that are used in this 
research to collect item information; obtaining items from suspicion’s nomological 
network and extracting items from subject matter expert inputs based a conceptual 
definition for IT suspicion.  This required an understanding of IT suspicion and 
theoretical definition from a thorough literature review (Hinkin, 1995), which was 
produced in Chapter 2.  Once this was accomplished, the existing research was used to 
create items and validate possible dimensions.  Items used came from the nomological 
network analysis.  Since suspicion constructs with different domains (other than IT) exist, 
they were fertile ground for suspicion measure items.  In addition, constructs for trust 
were used because the literature showed a strong negative correlation to suspicion.  Each 
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trust item used was reviewed and altered to ensure it addressed this research’s definition 
of suspicion.  Constructs from IT suspicion’s nomological net are shown in Appendix A. 
The second method of deductive development used involved the use of subject 
matter experts.  In this method, the researcher again develops a sound conceptual 
definition of the construct, and then surveys subject matter experts for critical input in 
developing items (Hinkin, 1995).  The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has 
experts on staff in the fields of IT and organizational behavior research.  Two of the 
members of this thesis’ research committee are organizational behavior research experts 
and the other is an IT expert. 
The inductive method used for this research involved asking a sample of 
respondents to describe IT suspicion (Hinkin, 1995) and list ways to assess it.  The 
respondents are from the general AFIT student population, and the results assisted the 
research effort in several ways.  First, the results provided more items for use in the final 
measure.  They also provided reinforcement by repeating already determined items.  
Finally, the provided IT suspicion descriptions guided the exploration of possible IT 
suspicion construct dimensions and validated the final conceptual definition of IT 
suspicion.  The responses are listed in Appendix B. 
Throughout the entire item generation process, content validity was maintained to 
the greatest extent that was workably feasible.  Hinkin stated that there are two primary 
concerns with item generation.  First, some measures lack proper content validity and 
second, some researchers fails to report their method for items generation (Hinkin, 1995).  
Using multiple methods for items generation and a thorough review of the existing 
literature helps strengthen the argument for the validity of the IT suspicion construct.  
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Once the list of items is compiled and compared, care must be taken to avoid extraneous 
content but guarantee the measure still captures the IT suspicion domain (Hinkin, 1995). 
Hinkin also outlined five important issues that must be addressed in scale 
development.  They are the details of the sample chosen, the use of reverse-scored items, 
the number of items, the scaling of the items, and the sample size (Hinkin, 1995).  The 
sample came from the AFIT student population.  Due to time constraints, this was the 
most feasible method to obtain volunteers.  Hinkin’s (1995) research explored 31 
different studies that used reverse-scored (negatively worded) items.  His examination of 
those studies showed no discernable pattern of problems in the analysis but the reverse-
scored item loading was lower (Hinkin, 1995).  Therefore, reverse-scored items were not 
used because loading was already assumed to be an issue due to a projected small sample 
size.  The number of items used must be enough to define the construct without being too 
long in order guarantee construct validity and avoid response biases (Hinkin, 1995) 
respectively.  Therefore, eight or nine items were used for each measure.  A 5-point 
Likert scale is used to maximize reliability (Hinkin, 1995).  The sample size was based 
solely on volunteers from the student body, so a low number was an undesirable but 
ultimately unavoidable result. 
 
Procedure 
The trait IT suspicion measure was administered with a disposition to trust and a 
locus of control measure.  The intent was to establish a trait IT suspicion baseline and use 
other validated constructs from suspicion’s nomological network for analyzing validity.  
Judge et al. used internality (Levenson, 1981) interchangeably with locus of control in a 
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core self-evaluation publication (Judge et al., 2003).  The original scale was modified 
from a 7-point to a 5-point scale for measure consistency.  Two dispositional trust scales 
were also administered using a 5-point scale; one from a relational trust article (Rodgers 
and Deng, 2004) and the other from a virtual trust article (Riding et al., 2002).  Neither of 
the scales is specific to the domain of IT. 
The trait characteristic measure was followed by a simple computer task with a 
manipulation unknown to test subjects intended to raise a moderate level of suspicion.  
The task prompted the subject to write a paragraph about that day’s work schedule, create 
a summary spreadsheet, and combine the two documents and save them in a created 
folder.  The control panel was altered from the manufacturer settings in order to induce 
suspicion.  The left and right mouse button functions were reverse, the double-click speed 
was increased, the pointer format was altered, and the pointer had a trail added to it 
(appears like multiple shadows).  Upon completion of the computer task, the state IT 
suspicion measure was administered to determine an induced level of state IT suspicion.  
The entire IT suspicion survey is shown in Appendix C. 
 
Measure Analysis 
 To further validate the new IT suspicion measure, a factor analysis and internal 
reliability test was accomplished on the pilot study data.  An exploratory factor analysis 
was accomplished to reduce the set of items to a more parsimonious representation of IT 
suspicion, to test for multiple dimensions, and to provide evidence of construct validity 
(Hinkin, 1998).  The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software was 
used to accomplish this task.  After a preliminary comparison of the inter-item 
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correlations was accomplished to eliminate all items with a correlation of less than .4 to 
all the other items, the Eigenvalues for the potential factors were determined using factor 
analysis.  Any group with a value greater than one was retained for further analysis 
(Hinkin, 1998).  If multiple factors were present with Eigenvalues greater than one, each 
factor was explored using higher order factor analysis.  The process was continued until 
the uncorrelated factors were identified or only one factor was extracted (Arnau, 1998). 
 Once an exploratory factor analysis was completed, providing a level of 
validation and narrowing the list of items, the reliability of the results was checked.  
SPSS was also used for this analysis.  Once uni-dimensionality has been established 
through factor analysis, reliability can be determined using Cronbach’s alpha (Hinkin, 
1998).  The remaining factors were tested for reliability, with a desired coefficient alpha 
of at least .7 for a new measure (Hinkin, 1998).  Once the reliability was tested and the 
locus of control and disposition to trust measures were analyzed in the same manner as IT 
suspicion, the remaining groups were compared to the locus of control and disposition to 
trust measures using inter-correlation analysis. 
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
 
20 respondents from the Air Force Institute of Technology participated in the IT 
suspicion survey.  There were 18 male and 2 female participants, all active duty Air 
Force officers.  The results were entered into SPSS for the following analysis.  Principal 
component factor analysis was used with all factors (components) retained having 
Eigenvalues greater than 1. 
 
Analysis of IT suspicion measure 
As previously mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, the created suspicion measure 
included items to address trait and state suspicion, as well as generalized system 
questions and data specific questions.  The trait IT suspicion general questions (trait-
general) are items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the trait measure, while the trait IT suspicion data 
related questions (trait-data) are items 6, 7, 8, and 9.   The state IT suspicion general 
questions (state-general) are items 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 of the state measure, and the data 
specific questions (state-data) are items 1 and 6. 
A first order exploratory factor analysis with orthogonal (Varimax) rotation was 
accomplished for the entire IT suspicion portion of the measure to begin the analysis.  
Results shown in Table 1 indicate highly correlated factors, which is consistent with 
expectations because all items measure some form of suspicion. 
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Component 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.732 0.225 0.478 0.305 0.265 0.147
2 -0.622 0.599 0.371 0.272 0.147 0.144
3 0.230 0.675 -0.403 -0.058 -0.104 -0.561
4 -0.009 0.064 -0.527 -0.033 0.788 0.310
5 0.067 0.252 0.266 -0.900 0.031 0.226
6 0.139 0.259 -0.350 0.138 -0.525 0.704
Table 1.  Entire Construct Component Transformation Matrix
 
 
After the first order factor analysis with orthogonal rotation, a first order factor 
analysis with oblique (Oblimin) rotation, shown in Table 2, was accomplished for the 
entire IT suspicion portion of the measure (Arnau, 1998).  Results indicate low 
correlations (<.2) between factors.  What begins to emerge is a pattern between the way 
items were created for the IT suspicion measure and the way items are loading under 
components in the factor analysis. 
Analysis of the structure matrix shows three of the five trait-general items load 
under factor 3; items 2 and 3 do not.  All four trait-data load under factor 2.  Six of the 
seven state-general load under factor 1; with item 5 being the exception.  These are the 
three factors with the highest Eigenvalues and they explain 60% of the variance.  The 
state data didn’t load well under any factor, so it was removed from further analysis. 
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Item 1 2 3 4 5 6
Trait IT suspicion item 1 0.241 -0.132 -0.870 0.100 -0.243 0.366
Trait IT suspicion item 2 -0.094 -0.067 -0.204 -0.082 -0.108 0.887
Trait IT suspicion item 3 0.164 0.032 -0.187 0.197 -0.921 0.157
Trait IT suspicion item 4 0.122 0.251 -0.858 0.275 -0.089 0.132
Trait IT suspicion item 5 0.121 0.230 -0.628 0.131 -0.659 0.085
Trait IT suspicion item 6 0.191 0.413 -0.802 -0.112 -0.435 0.113
Trait IT suspicion item 7 -0.016 0.716 -0.215 -0.090 -0.608 -0.131
Trait IT suspicion item 8 -0.164 0.879 -0.160 0.211 0.015 -0.017
Trait IT suspicion item 9 -0.208 0.764 -0.381 0.035 -0.003 -0.171
State IT suspicion item 1 0.159 0.154 -0.260 0.628 -0.083 0.728
State IT suspicion item 2 0.899 0.052 -0.215 -0.032 -0.055 -0.121
State IT suspicion item 3 0.855 -0.162 -0.055 0.169 -0.102 0.177
State IT suspicion item 4 0.874 0.024 -0.175 -0.033 -0.072 -0.081
State IT suspicion item 5 -0.250 0.257 -0.101 0.707 -0.433 0.240
State IT suspicion item 6 0.311 0.767 0.039 0.176 -0.339 0.191
State IT suspicion item 7 0.892 -0.151 -0.014 0.255 -0.162 -0.181
State IT suspicion item 8 0.782 0.033 -0.173 0.341 -0.166 0.337
State IT suspicion item 9 0.414 0.115 -0.189 0.827 -0.084 -0.101
Table 2.  Construct Structure Matrix
Component
 
 
 A second order factor analysis with orthogonal rotation was then completed on 
the trait suspicion measure items.  Results, shown in Table 3, again indicate highly 
correlated factors for trait general (component 1) and trait data (component 2), which is 
also expected due to the fact that they were both trait level suspicion measures. 
Component 1 2 3
1 0.647 0.512 0.565
2 -0.555 0.824 -0.111
3 0.522 0.241 -0.818
Table 3.  Trait Component Transformation Matrix
 
 As a result, a second order factor analysis with oblique rotation was accomplished 
on the trait suspicion measure, indicating low correlation between factors (<.3).  The 
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structure matrix, Table 4, shows four of the five trait-general items load on factor 1, and 
all four trait-data items load on factor 2 with some cross-loading with factor 1 for item 6. 
Item 1 2 3
Trait IT suspicion item 1 0.924 -0.012 -0.323
Trait IT suspicion item 2 0.540 -0.205 -0.009
Trait IT suspicion item 3 0.204 -0.068 -0.890
Trait IT suspicion item 4 0.789 0.406 -0.211
Trait IT suspicion item 5 0.568 0.265 -0.722
Trait IT suspicion item 6 0.674 0.480 -0.579
Trait IT suspicion item 7 -0.009 0.650 -0.696
Trait IT suspicion item 8 -0.029 0.880 -0.078
Trait IT suspicion item 9 0.101 0.864 -0.165
Table 4.  Trait Structure Matrix
Component
 
 A third order factor analysis with orthogonal rotation on the trait general 
suspicion items shown in Table 5 reflects two significant factors, one with an Eigenvalue 
of 2.48, but the second with an Eigenvalue of 1.030, so its contribution is questionable.  
The un-rotated solution indicates items 1, 4, and 5 have loaded properly on factor 1; 
however items 3 and 4 are problematic and were therefore removed from further analysis. 
Item 1 2
Trait IT suspicion item 1 0.842 0.301
Trait IT suspicion item 2 0.402 0.685
Trait IT suspicion item 3 0.584 -0.557
Trait IT suspicion item 4 0.776 0.135
Trait IT suspicion item 5 0.819 -0.376
Table 5.  Trait-General Component Matrix
Component
 
 A final factor analysis on items 1, 4, and 5, shown in Table 6, yields one factor 
with an Eigenvalue of 2.15, representing 71.5% of the variance with a reliability 
coefficient alpha of .796.  Therefore, these three items are retained for the final trait-
general portion of the measure. 
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Component
Item 1
Trait IT suspicion item 1 0.853
Trait IT suspicion item 4 0.889
Trait IT suspicion item 5 0.793
Table 6.  Final Trait-General Component Matrix
 
 A third order factor analysis with orthogonal rotation on the data items of the trait 
measure, shown in Table 7, reveals one factor with an Eigenvalue of 2.42, representing 
60.5% of the variance, and with a coefficient alpha of .774.  Therefore, these four items 
are retained for the final trait-data portion of the measure. 
Component
Item 1
Trait IT suspicion item 6 0.694
Trait IT suspicion item 7 0.809
Trait IT suspicion item 8 0.765
Trait IT suspicion item 9 0.836
Table 7.  Final Trait-Data Component Matrix
 
 After completing the exploratory factor analysis for the trait portion of the IT 
suspicion measure, a second order factor analysis with orthogonal rotation was completed 
on the general items of the state suspicion measure, shown in Table 8, revealing two 
uncorrelated factors (<.2).  Factor one accounted for 57.3% of the variance. 
Item 1 2
State IT suspicion item 2 0.887 -0.192
State IT suspicion item 3 0.855 -0.034
State IT suspicion item 4 0.861 -0.170
State IT suspicion item 5 -0.157 0.907
State IT suspicion item 7 0.904 -0.001
State IT suspicion item 8 0.801 0.134
State IT suspicion item 9 0.523 0.730
Table 8.  State-General Component Matrix
Component
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The second factor, which contained items 5 and 9, was therefore removed and the 
analysis was accomplished again, shown in Table 9, yielding one factor with an 
Eigenvalue of 3.75, representing 75.1% of the variance, and with a coefficient alpha of 
.916.  Therefore, these five items were retained for the final state-general portion of the 
measure.  Again, no state-data items were retained in the final analysis. 
Component
Item 1
State IT suspicion item 2 0.895
State IT suspicion item 3 0.870
State IT suspicion item 4 0.873
State IT suspicion item 7 0.894
State IT suspicion item 8 0.798
Table 9.  Final State-General Component Matrix
 
 
Analysis of locus of control measure 
 An exploratory factor analysis of the locus of control measure, shown in Table 10, 
yielded four possible factors.  Items 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 loaded well on the first factor and 
explained 30.0% of the variance.  Factors 2, 3, and 4 did not load well so they were 
removed from further analysis. 
Item 1 2 3 4
Locus of control item 1 0.504 -0.686 -0.336 -0.027
Locus of control item 2 0.277 -0.353 0.481 0.615
Locus of control item 3 0.068 0.723 -0.353 0.392
Locus of control item 4 0.174 0.439 0.782 -0.028
Locus of control item 5 0.801 0.071 -0.034 -0.435
Locus of control item 6 0.682 -0.290 0.008 0.375
Locus of control item 7 0.537 0.495 -0.383 0.278
Locus of control item 8 0.799 0.240 0.189 -0.294
Table 10.  Initial Locus of Control Component Matrix
Component
 
 
30 
 
A second order factor analysis on the first component, shown in Table 11, yields 
one strong and one weak component.  The strong component includes items 1, 5, 6, 7, 
and 8 and explained 46.7% of the variance.  There was cross-loading between 
components for item 1 so it was removed from further analysis. 
Item 1 2
Locus of control item 1 0.548 0.720
Locus of control item 5 0.823 -0.193
Locus of control item 6 0.665 0.428
Locus of control item 7 0.547 -0.337
Locus of control item 8 0.787 -0.427
Component
Table 11.  Interim Locus of Control Component Matrix
 
A third order factor analysis on items 5, 6, 7, and 8, shown in Table 12, lists all 
four items loading under one factor with an Eigenvalue of 2.147, representing 53.7% of 
the variance, and a reliability coefficient alpha of .706.  These four items were retained 
for the final analysis. 
Component
Item 1
Locus of control item 5 0.828
Locus of control item 6 0.606
Locus of control item 7 0.604
Locus of control item 8 0.854
Table 12.  Final Locus of Control Component Matrix
 
 
Analysis of disposition to trust measure 
 As explained in Chapter 3, the disposition to trust measure was composed of two 
separate instruments that were intended to measure the same target construct.  An 
exploratory factor analysis of the items, shown in Table 13, from these measures 
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indicates two components, item numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 loading under one and item 
7 on the second.   Component one had an Eigenvalue of 4.949 and accounted for 61.8% 
of the variance, therefore item 7 was removed. 
Item 1 2
Disposition to trust item 1 0.769 -0.559
Disposition to trust item 2 0.871 0.181
Disposition to trust item 3 0.790 -0.242
Disposition to trust item 4 0.848 0.235
Disposition to trust item 5 0.899 -0.101
Disposition to trust item 6 0.802 0.309
Disposition to trust item 7 0.610 0.648
Disposition to trust item 8 0.656 -0.439
Component
Table 13.  Intial Disposition to Trust Component Matrix
 
A secondary factor analysis was accomplished on the remaining seven items.  The 
results in Table 14 show one component representing 66.1% of the variance with an 
Eigenvalue of 4.631 and a coefficient alpha .911.  Therefore, the seven items were 
retained for the final analysis. 
Component
Item 1
Disposition to trust item 1 0.817
Disposition to trust item 2 0.859
Disposition to trust item 3 0.808
Disposition to trust item 4 0.825
Disposition to trust item 5 0.903
Disposition to trust item 6 0.784
Disposition to trust item 8 0.678
Table 14.  Final Disposition to Trust Component Matrix
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Inter-measure correlations 
 Once the factor analysis and reliability testing were completed, the remaining 
items from the trait general, trait data, and state general portions of the IT suspicion 
measure were compared to the revised locus of control and disposition to trust measures.  
Results are shown in Table 15.  Due to the low sample size, most of the analysis was 
insignificant.  The correlation table does show one significant relationship, between 
revised locus of control and the general portion of the state suspicion measure, with a p-
value of .0078.  The -.576 correlation mirrors the multicollinearity expected in the 
literature review, without being so large as to indicate the locus of control and state-
general measures represent the same phenomena.  No other correlations had a p-value 
less than .05.  However, another result of interest is the lack of a substantial correlation 
between disposition to trust and any of the remaining suspicion measures, reinforcing the 
literature review statement that lack of trust and suspicion are indeed different. 
Measure
Revised trait general 
suspicion
Trait data suspcion Revised state general 
suspicion
Revised locus of 
control
Revised disposition to 
trust
Revised trait general 
suspicion
α=.796
Trait data suspicion 0.412 α=.774
Revised state general 
suspicion
0.227 -0.044 α=.916
Revised LOC 0.064 0.323 -0.576** α=.706
Revised disposition to 
trust
0.167 0.279 -0.169 0.222 α=.911
N=20          ** denotes correlation is significant at p<0.01 level.
Table 15.  Inter-Measure Correlations
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V.  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Discussion 
 The results of the IT suspicion factor analysis show the state and trait portions of 
the measure load on different factors, providing a level of confirmation that suspicion is 
composed of a state and trait component.  This result provides strong validation that the 
literature review was correct in stating that suspicion has an enduring trait component as 
well as a situation-based state component that can be manipulated by outside factors.   In 
addition, the analysis shows state and trait IT suspicion themselves are not single 
dimension constructs.  The loading of general IT system and data specific items under 
different components in the factor analysis indicate suspicion of IT as a whole may be too 
broad an area to research.  Suspicion of infrastructure, stored data, software, and other 
specific areas of IT and IT output may require more focused research.  In addition, there 
are other factors that may contribute to IT suspicion, including knowledge of other 
individuals using the IT system, programming it, and supplying data.  In order to gain a 
fuller understanding of the underlying mechanisms of IT suspicion, it appears more 
focused and bounded research is required to narrow IT suspicion down to more simplistic 
relationships then build it back up in a more complex, all-encompassing model with 
multiple dimensions.  This analysis would require more factors and a much larger sample 
size in order to accomplish confirmatory factor analysis. 
 The factor analysis of the locus of control and disposition to trust measures had 
mixed results.  The locus of control measure did not load as well as expected, although 
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item reduction through factor analysis did yield a four item measure that met the 
requirements of the research methodology.  A different locus of control measure may 
lead to better results in follow-on research.  The combination of two disposition to trust 
measures yielded excellent results in the factor analysis.  Only one item was removed 
because of cross-loading, and it still loaded well on the first factor. 
 With a sample size of 20, it was unrealistic to expect significant results from a 
correlation analysis of the individual measures in the IT suspicion survey.  However, 
even though the sample size was small, analysis revealed a significant negative 
correlation between the state-general items and locus of control.  Based on the literature 
review, this is an expected result.   If locus of control is indeed defined as the degree to 
which individuals believe they control their own fate (Robbins and Judge, 2008) and 
those who have a high locus of control tend to be less suspicious (Robbins and Judge, 
2008), one might expect a negative correlation between locus of control and all suspicion.  
However, the sample size is small, and it would take a very strong relationship for this to 
surface in this analysis.  Individuals who don’t believe they control their lives (low locus 
of control) tend to be more suspicious (Robbins and Judge, 2008) and should therefore be 
more sensitive to changes in normal activities and procedures.  Since the state suspicion 
measure was primed with a manipulation of computer control panel presets used by most 
individuals, the strongest correlation for locus of control should theoretically be with 
state suspicion, and it should be negative. 
 There were no significant correlations between the different suspicion 
components of the IT suspicion measure.  The final state-general suspicion had almost no 
 
35 
 
correlation with either of the trait suspicion components.  However, the two trait 
components were correlated (.412).  These relationships were not significant but they do 
provide additional evidence to support a fundamental difference between state and trait 
suspicion.  As state in Chapter 4, the lack of correlation between any of the suspicion 
measures and disposition to trust also provides validation to the assertion that suspicion 
and trust do indeed measure different phenomena. 
 There does appear to be an oversight in the literature review.  The definition of IT 
suspicion states that an IT system’s behavior will negatively impact the user’s desired 
task.  However, basic security measures can impede a user’s task and not arouse 
suspicion.  They are, in fact, expected.  A revised definition might read: 
User perceptions that the direction, duration, and intensity of an IT system’s unexpected 
behavior will negatively impact their task.                                                    
 
Implications 
 There are many potential uses for a validated IT suspicion measure.  It can be 
used by human resources in a couple of different ways to determine the proper job fit for 
a particular employee.  It can also be used to IT systems and software before 
implementation.  Proper use of the IT suspicion measure comes down to pre-determining 
the appropriate level of suspicion desired for a particular situation. 
 Determining the best personality for a job ahead of time could be one of the uses 
of an IT suspicion measure.  A locus of control and trait IT suspicion measure or a locus 
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of control and state measure with a job specific manipulation could be administered prior 
to job placement in career fields that are heavily reliant on information technology.  
Examples of use could be when hiring IT related equipment operators or network security 
employees.  It would be desirable that the IT equipment operator (a pilot, for instance) 
have low suspicion of the IT systems the job required, especially since this research’s 
definition of suspicion is based on expectation of negative task impact.  It may, however, 
be more desirable for someone in information and network security to be more 
suspicious.  The level of IT suspicion should fit the IT related job. 
 Not only can an IT suspicion measure be used to fit an employee to an IT system, 
it can be used to test a new IT system with existing employees.  If a company wanted to 
run a test on a database management system or something else IT related that would be 
shared between multiple organizations, an IT suspicion measure could prove to be a 
valuable part of the testing process.  Possibly administered with a satisfaction survey, an 
IT suspicion measure tailored to the particular IT system could be used to determine the 
suspicion of that IT system.  If it is too high, the employees may be hesitant to use the 
system and it could affect productivity.  This could also be an analysis technique of 
existing technology, created to determine why an IT system isn’t used to its maximum 
capability.  Specific suspicions could be determined in order to facilitate system 
improvement or training efforts that would increase system usage, security, or efficiency. 
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Limitations 
 There are several limitations that may have affected the results of this research 
effort.  The small sample size clearly affected the significance of the analysis, although 
one major relationship, locus of control and state suspicion, was still observed.  A much 
larger sample size would definitely expose the presence of weaker but still significant 
relationships between state suspicion, trait suspicion, locus of control, and disposition to 
trust.  It would also allow for confirmatory factor analysis as part of a more thorough 
validation process. 
 Another dominant limitation to this analysis was the test subjects were aware that 
IT suspicion was the general topic of the research.  This creates demand characteristics 
that possibly biased the results.  Test subjects should be unaware of the topic in the future 
to avoid demand characteristics. 
 The delays and problems associated with the computer procurement and a fixed 
end-date to the research effort led to the third limitation.  A complex and effective yet 
subtle manipulation intended to induce a level of suspicion that was real but undetectable 
to the test subject was not created.  The timeline did not allow for one to be generated 
using outside help.  The manipulation substituted in its place included simplistic 
alterations to the control panel presets to the mouse and cursor, which would impede use. 
This did achieve a level doubt in computer performance, but it was also overt in nature. 
Lack of equalization of treatments was the final significant limitation.  The 
measure was administered to different size groups in different locations.   While they 
were instructed not to talk to each other while taking the IT suspicion measure, test 
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subject group members new each other and the groups were as large as five participants.  
There was limited talking and other non-verbal forms of communication that could have 
biased results.  In an ideal situation, the test subjects would have participated in a 
controlled environment, by themselves so as to be isolated from outside influence. 
 
Future research 
 As the analysis explains, there appears to be multiple dimensions to IT suspicion, 
and further research could help explain the multiple relationships within the construct of 
IT suspicion.  Further review of the literatures of suspicion, trust, locus of control, and IT 
will help to better define the mechanisms behind these constructs.  Once complete, a 
methodology of study for these more focused relationships can be created and tested.  All 
future analysis should contain an adequate sample size with preliminary testing before 
factor analysis on the measure is accomplished.  The testing should indicate if the data is 
adequate for factor analysis and include: inter-item correlation matrix review similar to 
the analysis of this research; off-diagonal review of the anti-image covariance matrix 
searching for low correlations; Bartlett’s test of sphericity; and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy (Hair et al., 1995). 
 For example, the analysis shows a strong relationship between locus of control 
and IT state suspicion and the literature supports a relationship between both IT trait and 
state suspicion and locus of control.  Creating a model of the relationship between the 
three concepts when a stimulus is introduced appears to be a valid avenue of research.  A 
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revised measure could be created to test the model, using a much larger sample size than 
this research in order to achieve significant results. 
 A revised version of the existing measure could also be tested across different 
cultures.  This would allow researchers to test and see the level of IT suspicion structural 
invariance.  Testing nationalities outside of the United States would provide interesting 
results for use in areas such as psychological operations and information warfare, or 
something as simple as advertising.  Comparing civilian and military subjects may help 
aid in the study and understanding of military culture and assist in recruitment and 
retention.  
In addition to adding greater depth into the previously explored areas of suspicion 
literature, adding breadth to the literature review by researching social engineering could 
provide vital understanding of the mechanisms of IT suspicion.  This research viewed IT 
as a stand-alone domain, disregarding what specific part of the IT system made the user 
suspicious.  That was intentional, in order to achieve a high-level picture of IT suspicion.  
The social engineering literature may provide a better understanding of what a user is 
suspicious of and what mechanisms activate a detectable level of suspicion.  This could 
assist in creating a holistic, multi-dimensional view of IT suspicion, specifically as it 
relates to refining the concepts of data and general IT suspicion under the state and trait 
domains.  The system user’s focus of suspicion needs to be determined, whether it is at 
the software, at the hardware, or at the idea that an individual is maliciously manipulating 
the IT system. 
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A main factor in any future research should be increasing the sample size and 
number of items.  This will help increase the significance.  The test subjects should also 
come from a less focused group (Air Force company grade officers) in order to increase 
generalizability of the resulting construct. 
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Appendix A: Existing Construct Measures 
Generalized Communication Suspicion (Levine and McCornack, 1991) 
1.  Everyone lies, the person who says they don’t is the biggest liar of all. 
2.  I often feel as if people aren’t being completely truthful with me. 
3.  Most often people only tell you what they think you want to hear. 
4.  When I am in a conversation with someone, I frequently wonder whether they are 
really telling me the truth. 
5.  People rarely tell you what they’re really thinking. 
6.  The best policy is to trust people until proven wrong. 
7.  Dishonesty is part of human nature. 
8.  When I first meet someone, I assume they are probably lying to me about some things. 
9.  Most people are basically honest. 
10.  Anyone who completely trusts someone else is asking for trouble. 
11.  When I ask a stranger for directions, I frequently wonder whether they are being 
truthful. 
12.  When I am talking to others, I tend to believe what they say. 
13.  People seldom lie to me. 
14.  Most people follow the saying “honesty is the best policy.” 
 
Trust-Suspicion (Heretick, 1981) 
1.  I think most people would lie to get ahead. 
2.  Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain a profit or an advantage rather 
than lose the advantage. 
3.  I commonly wonder what hidden reasons another person may have for doing 
something nice for me. 
4.  It is safer to trust nobody. 
5.  Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people. 
6.  I tend to place a great deal of trust in other people and have seldom been disappointed. 
 
Five questions of the suspiciousness index (Edelman, 1970) 
1.  What was the purpose of this experiment? 
2.  Did you notice anything unusual about this experiment?  If so, what? 
3.  Do you feel this experiment was deceptive (involved lying) in any way?  If so, how? 
4.  Do you have any reservations or doubts about the intelligence test you took?  If so, 
what? 
5.  Do you think the experimenter was lying to you about the average scores on the 
intelligence test? 
 
Two question perceived suspicion measure (Stiff et al, 1992) 
1.  I was highly concerned about whether my interview partner was responding truthfully. 
2.  I was very suspicious about what my partner was saying during the interview. 
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Appendix B: Student Responses to Item Request 
Respondent 1 
I personally know the source of the message. 
I am confident that the sender is who he/she says they are. 
I believe that the message was tampered with between sender and receiver. 
I believe that the message is in the proper (or intended) graphical format. 
 
Respondent 2 
1) Do you ever notice anything unfamiliar about your desktop or the way a plug-n-play 
device is acting? 
2) If there is a patch pushed out during the evening (i.e. Windows or DoD update), do 
you ever notice any changes in normal operability from the day before?  Do you notice a 
change in your desktop or toolbar? 
3) Are there ever times when your internet communications slows to the point where you 
feel something might be effecting you computer? 
4) How many times a week do you avoid certain programs/files/e-mails because you 
aren't sure of what they will do to your computer? 
 
Respondent 3 
On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = always distrust, 2 = usually distrust, 3 = neither trust nor 
distrust, 4 = usually trust, and 5 = always trust, please respond to the following 
statements:  
 
1.  I ______________ that my email messages are received by the intended recipients.  
2.  I ______________ that I can access all my documents that are stored on my computer 
whenever I need to.  
3.  I ______________ that I can access all my files that are stored on the network 
whenever I need to.  
4.  I ______________ that my password is protected when I use it to access various 
websites (i.e. MyPay, online banking, etc).  
5.  I ______________ that no one has access to my email except for me and those I give 
permission to have access (i.e. USAF monitoring policy).  
 
Respondent 4 
Is my private information being shared when I am unaware? 
Is it going to the wrong people? 
Is my IP being stored to track my movement through the web? 
Am I going to get spam mail if they ask for my e-mail address or do I even need to input 
it to get spam? 
How do I know I won't get a virus from this?   
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Appendix C: IT Suspicion Survey 
SURVEY NUMBER _____ 
 
 
Disagree 
Very Much 
 
Disagree 
Slightly 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Slightly 
 
Agree 
Very Much 
1. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my 
ability.      
2. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly 
on how good a driver I am.      
3. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them 
work.      
4. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I 
am.      
5. I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life.      
6. I am usually able to protect my personal interests.      
7. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked 
hard for it.      
8. My life is determined by my own actions.      
9. I am the sort of person who generally tends to trust 
others.      
10. I am the sort of person who generally tends to believe 
that others have good intentions.      
11. I am the sort of person who generally tends to trust what 
people say.      
12. I am the sort of person who generally tends to believe 
that people are basically moral.      
13. I am the sort of person who generally tends to believe in 
human goodness.      
14. I generally have faith in humanity.      
15. I feel that people are generally reliable.      
16. I generally trust other people unless they give me reason 
not to.      
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SURVEY NUMBER _____ 
 
 
Disagree 
Very Much 
 
Disagree 
Slightly 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Slightly 
 
Agree 
Very Much 
1. I feel that IT systems I use provide valid information.      
2. Computers never lie.      
3. The best policy is to trust an IT system until proven 
wrong.      
4. When using my IT system, I always believe what is 
presented.      
5. The output of most IT systems is valid.      
6. I always trust the data that my IT systems provide.      
7. I believe I have full access to all data stored locally on 
my computer.      
8. I believe I have full access to all data stored on the 
network.      
9. I always have complete confidence in the integrity of my 
computer data.      
STOP!  WAIT FOR INSTRUCTIONS 
Next, complete the following exercise. 
Step 1.  Open Microsoft Word on the laptop provided to you and write a paragraph explaining 
your entire work schedule for today, briefly summarizing all planned activities.  Once complete, 
please run spell check.  Create a folder on the desktop named the 2-digit number on your survey 
and save the document as your 2-digit number.doc. 
Step 2.  Open Microsoft Excel and create a table summarizing your entire duty day schedule to 
embed at the end of the word document.  Save as your 2-digit number.xls or xlsx in the same 
folder and insert the table into the Word file, resaving the Word file. 
Note:  AFIT/SC has certified that each of these machines is running 
correctly.  No changes to the computers attributes are necessary or 
allowed. 
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STOP!  WAIT FOR INSTRUCTIONS 
 
SURVEY NUMBER _____ 
 
 
Disagree 
Very Much 
 
Disagree 
Slightly 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Slightly 
 
Agree 
Very Much 
1. I have complete confidence in the integrity of the data 
stored on this computer.      
2. I noticed no unusual behaviors.      
3. I was never concerned about whether my computer was 
working properly.      
4. I noticed no unfamiliar behaviors.      
5. The output of the computer was valid.      
6. I believe I have full access to all data stored locally on 
this computer.      
7. My computer was acting normally.      
8. The software on this computer is operated the way I 
expected.      
9. I was not suspicions about what my computer was 
presenting to me.      
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